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For example, they let us know which features and sections are most popular. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
When the law provides that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.
This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside of this code. Culpability as to illegality of conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the code so provides. Culpability as determinant of grade of offense.
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When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.
Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: 1 Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; 2 He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; 3 He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or 4 He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: 1 With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he a Solicits such other person to commit it; b Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or c Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or 2 His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: 1 He is a victim of that offense; 2 The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or 3 He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C d.
Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: 1 The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations.
If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; 2 The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or 3 The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
As used in this section: 1 "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program; 2 "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation; 3 "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation. Intoxication a. Except as provided in subsection d.
When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4. Intoxication which 1 is not self-induced or 2 is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required: 1 "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body; 2 "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime; 3 "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
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Consent a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. Consent to bodily harm.
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When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if: 1 The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or 2 The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or 3 The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: 1 It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or 2 It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or 3 It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
Entrapment a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either: 1 Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or 2 Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. Execution of public duty a. Except as provided in subsection b. The other sections of this chapter apply to: 1 The use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and 2 The use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law.
The justification afforded by subsection a.
Use of Force in Self-Protection. Use of force justifiable for protection of the person. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
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Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force. Use of force for the protection of other persons a. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when: 1 The actor would be justified under section 2C in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and 2 Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and 3 The actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of such other person.
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Notwithstanding subsection a. Use of force in defense of premises. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of premises.
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The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor reasonably believes that: a Such request would be useless; b It would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or c Substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made.
The use of force is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily harm. The use of deadly force is not justifiable under subsection a. An actor within a dwelling shall be presumed to have a reasonable belief in the existence of the danger.
The State must rebut this presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Use of force in defense of personal property. Subject to the provisions of subsection d.